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Abstract
We re-examine the probabilistic foundation of the link between Z-score measures and banks
probability of insolvency, o¤ering an improved measure of that probability without impos-
ing further distributional assumptions. While the traditional measure of the probability of
insolvency thus provides a less e¤ective upper bound of the probability of insolvency, it can
be meaningfully reinterpreted as a measure capturing the odds of insolvency instead. We
similarly obtain rened probabilistic interpretations of the commonly used simple and log-
transformed Z-score measures; in particular, the log of the Z-score is shown to be negatively
proportional to the log odds of insolvency.
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1. Introduction
The recent nancial crisis has refocused attention on the general importance, impact and
measurement of banksinsolvency and liquidity risk. A popular risk measure in the banking
and nancial stability related literature that reects a banks probability of insolvency is
the Z-score.1 Its widespread use2 is due to its relative simplicity and the fact that it can be
calculated using only accounting information; this, in contrast to market-based risk measures,
makes it also applicable to the substantial number of unlisted nancial institutions.3 In
its general form, allowing for non-normal return distributions, it is generally attributed to
Hannan and Hanweck (1988) and Boyd et al. (1993); Boyd and Graham (1986) had previously
introduced Z-scores in the special context of normal return distributions.
In this paper, we re-examine the probabilistic foundation of this general approach to
proxying a banks probability of insolvency, demonstrating that it is in fact possible to rene,
i.e. improve on, the measure of the probability of insolvency implied by this traditional
approach without imposing any further distributional assumptions. We show that while the
traditional measure of the probability of insolvency thus provides a less e¤ective upper bound
of the probability of insolvency, it can in fact be meaningfully reinterpreted as a measure
capturing the odds of insolvency instead.4 We then further show that this renement of
the probabilistic foundation of Z-score measures implies that the risk measures commonly
used in the existing literature, such as the simple Z-score or its log-transformation, are also
more closely related to the odds of insolvency than the probability of insolvency itself. As a
1This methodology should not be confused with the Altman (1968) Z-score measure used in the
corporate nance literature; see Altman (2002, ch. 1) for a discussion.
2For some recent papers using this methodology, see e.g. Berger et al. (2014), Delis et al. (2014),
Fang et al. (2014), Fu et al. (2014), Hakenes et al. (2014); Beck et al. (2013), Bertay et al. (2013),
DeYoung and Torna (2013).
3Note, however, that it is possible, if uncommon, to calculate Z-score measures using market
information as well.
4The odds of an event, i.e. the ratio of the probabilities in favor and against that event, indicate
how much more likely it is that the event occurs than that it does not occur. Franklin (2001,
ch. 10) argues that ordinary language use of odds predates Pascal and Fermats discovery of the
mathematics of probability in 1654.
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consequence, the log of the Z-score in particular emerges from our renement as an insolvency
risk measure that is attractive and unproblematic to use (even as a dependent variable in
standard regression analysis), providing more rigorously founded support to its emerging use
in the literature.
Section 2 now reviews the traditional probabilistic interpretation of Z-scores, introduces
our renement, and advances related risk measures reecting the odds of insolvency; Section
3 discusses some implications of our results for applied work; and Section 4 concludes the
paper.
2. Z-score measures: a rened probabilistic interpretation
Let us rst recapitulate the traditional justication for using Z-scores as a risk measure
reecting a banks probability of insolvency. In line with most of the existing literature,5 we
dene bank insolvency as a state where (car + roa)  0, with car the banks capital-asset
ratio and roa its return on assets. Hannan and Hanweck (1988) and Boyd et al. (1993) then
pointed out that if roa is a random variable with nite mean roa and variance 2roa, the
Chebyshev inequality allows one to state an upper bound of the probability of insolvency as6
p(roa   car)  Z 2 (1)
where the Z-score is dened as Z  car+roa
roa
> 0; we could refer to the measure Z 2 as the
traditional insolvency probability bound.7
5Some authors, e.g. Barry et al. (2011) and Bouvatier et al. (2014), consider an alternative
return-on-equity based Z-score measure as rst proposed in Goyeau and Tarazi (1992); we derive
an analogous rened probabilistic interpretation of such a measure in Appendix B.
6As similarly implemented by Roy (1952), this is an application of the (two-sided) Chebyshev
inequality (see Ross, 1997, p. 396): it states that for a random variable X with nite mean  and
variance 2, it holds for any k > 0 that P fjX   j  kg  2=k2.
7Hannan and Hanweck (1988) used this traditional insolvency probability bound as their proxy of
a banks probability of insolvency (under the additional assumption of symmetry). However, much
of the remaining empirical literature has followed Boyd and Graham (1986) and Boyd et al. (1993)
by using the simple Z-scores Z as the relevant bank insolvency risk measure instead; as such it is
3
  
Equation (1) gives a probabilistic interpretation of Z-scores as a particular non-linear
transformation of a banks probability of insolvency; this could have implications for the
correct formulation of empirical models and hypotheses and the meaningful discussion of
results. In this context it is therefore important to point out that it is in fact possible
to improve on the traditional insolvency probability bound given by Equation (1), without
imposing any further distributional assumptions, by drawing on the one-sided Chebyshev
inequality instead;8 we state this result in the following
Proposition 1. If roa is a random variable with nite mean roa and variance 2roa, an
(improved) upper bound of the banks probability of insolvency p is given by
p(roa   car)  1
1 + Z2
< 1 (2)
where the Z-score Z is dened as Z  car+roa
roa
> 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We could refer to the measure (1 + Z2) 1 characterized by Equation (2) as the improved
insolvency probability bound; it is straightforward to see that it is consistently tighter than
the traditional insolvency probability bound given by Equation (1), and is also naturally
bounded below one.9 In particular, we can state
Corollary 1. The traditional insolvency probability bound provides a less e¤ective upper
bound of the probability of insolvency than the improved measure given in Proposition 1; the
di¤erence between the traditional and improved measures D (Z) has a maximum value of 0:5
at Z = 1, with limZ!1D (Z) = limZ!0D (Z) = 0.
being widely used in cross-sectional, but increasingly also in panel studies (see Lepetit and Strobel
2013).
8Note that if the moment generating function of the random variable roa were known, one could
draw on the even more e¤ective Cherno¤ bounds (see Ross, 1997, p. 415); however, as our aim is
to construct a simple, robust bank insolvency risk measure, we do not pursue this further here.
9This is in contrast to the traditional insolvency probability bound, which needs to be bounded
at one for 0 < Z < 1, as Z 2 > 1 with limZ!0 Z 2 =1 in this case.
4
  
Figure 1. Plot of traditional vs. improved insolvency probability bounds, as function of 
             Z-score 
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Figure 2. Skewness of different Z-score measures, calculated for OECD commercial,  
             cooperative & savings banks (1998-2012) 
 
 
Proof. See the Appendix.
W thus observe that the lack of e¤ectiveness in the proxying of a banks probability of
insolvency encountered when relying on traditional insolvency probability bounds is particu-
larly large in the region that is arguably the most relevant in this context, i.e. for banks with
relatively low Z-scores and thus at signicant risk of becoming insolvent. This is illustrated in
Figure 1, which also shows that the di¤erence between the traditional and improved measures
does get (fairly rapidly) smaller the larger the Z-score, and thus the more remote the chance
of the bank becoming insolvent. The practical relevance of this lack of e¤ectiveness when
relying on traditional insolvency probability bounds will be illustrated further using real data
in Section 3.1.
Rather intriguingly, we can further note
Corollary 2. The traditional insolvency probability bound satises Z 2  p(roa car)
1 p(roa car) , i.e.
it gives an upper bound of the odds of insolvency.
Proof. This follows from rearranging equation (2).
While the traditional insolvency probability bound gives a less e¤ective upper bound of
5
  
the probability of insolvency based on our renement, it does in fact provide an upper bound
of the odds of insolvency, a closely related risk measure; we could thus, more appropriately,
refer to the measure Z 2 as the insolvency odds bound.10 Furthermore, our results also imply
a rened probabilistic interpretation of the more commonly used simple Z-scores Z as such,
as stated in the following
Corollary 3. The Z-score satises Z 

p(roa car)
1 p(roa car)
  1
2
, i.e. it gives a lower bound of the
inverse square root of the odds of insolvency.
Consequently, the log of the Z-score satises ln

p(roa car)
1 p(roa car)

  2 ln (Z), i.e. it is nega-
tively proportional to an upper bound of the log odds11 of insolvency.
Proof. This follows from Corollary 2.
Amongst these alternative, if intrinsically related insolvency risk measures, the Z-score or
its log-transformation are in widespread use in the empirical literature, whereas the improved
insolvency probability bound and the (reinterpreted) insolvency odds bound do not seem to
be commonly used so far. Notwithstanding any such implementation decision, the partic-
ular probabilistic interpretations of the di¤erent insolvency risk measures discussed might
prove useful when formulating empirical models and hypotheses and discussing results more
generally.
3. Further implications
3.1. Economic signicance
We now illustrate that the lack of e¤ectiveness arising (in line with Corollary 1) when a
banks probability of insolvency is proxied using traditional insolvency probability bounds is
of practical relevance in real data. For this, we calculate Z-scores, traditional and improved
insolvency probability bounds, and, in the rst instance, the resulting (relative) di¤erence
10Note that it thereby sheds some of the practical limitations, such as the need to be bounded at
one, attached to its previous interpretation as a probability bound.
11The term log odds was introduced by Barnard (1949).
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Table 1. Mean of different Z-score measures, relative difference between traditional & improved probability bounds, 
            and hypothetical equity buffers (relative & absolute) equating traditional & improved probability bounds, 
            for OECD commercial, cooperative & savings banks (1998-2012)
Number Mean
of Banks Z-score Ln(Z-score) Traditional 
Insolvency 
Probability 
Bound
Improved 
Insolvency 
Probability 
Bound
Relative 
Difference 
(%) of 
Traditional vs 
Improved 
Measure
Relative 
Hypothetical 
Capital Ratio 
Buffer (%) 
Equating 
Traditional 
and Improved 
Measure
Hypothetical 
Equity Buffer 
(million USD) 
Equating 
Traditional 
and Improved 
Measure
OECD 10949 39.564 3.258 0.0106 0.0092 0.991 0.947 2.391
Commercial 7604 32.221 3.113 0.0120 0.0104 1.123 1.116 3.068
Cooperative 1729 52.737 3.533 0.0067 0.0057 0.670 0.437 0.691
Savings 1616 60.020 3.642 0.0080 0.0068 0.713 0.695 1.023
US 7360 32.740 3.159 0.0096 0.0088 0.934 0.697 0.639
Commercial 6619 32.433 3.156 0.0090 0.0083 0.888 0.618 0.433
Cooperative 8 59.376 3.232 0.0130 0.0125 1.305 0.641 51.977
Savings 733 35.222 3.183 0.0154 0.0129 1.342 1.409 1.936
EU15 2497 53.671 3.545 0.0111 0.0087 0.919 1.656 6.156
Commercial 584 23.847 2.736 0.0418 0.0314 3.348 6.775 25.198
Cooperative 1270 60.027 3.745 0.0017 0.0017 0.173 0.091 0.349
Savings 643 68.206 3.884 0.0019 0.0018 0.186 0.098 0.329
Source: Own calculations using BvD Bankscope data.
between the traditional and improved measures using a dataset of OECD commercial, cooper-
ative and savings banks, extracted from BvD Bankscope and covering the period 19982012.12
We note from Table 1 that the average relative di¤erence between the traditional and
improved measures for our OECD sample is 0.991%, being highest for commercial banks
at 1.123% overall; it is particularly high for EU15 commercial banks at 3.348% and US
cooperative and savings banks at 1.305% and 1.342%, respectively. However, for the banks
with the lowest 10% of Z-scores, i.e. banks with a more pronounced risk of becoming insolvent,
we can see from Table 2 that the average relative di¤erence between the traditional and
12We clean for outliers/erroneous data by discarding the lowest/highest 0.75% of roa values and
any car values lying outside the range of 0 to 100%, retain for each bank the longest contiguous run
of observations, conditional on it covering at a minimum the period 2004-2009 (to allow our later
crisis/pre-crisis split), and end up with data for 10949 banks.
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Table 2. Mean of different Z-score measures, relative difference between traditional & improved probability bounds,
            and hypothetical equity buffers (relative & absolute) equating traditional & improved probability bounds, 
            for OECD commercial, cooperative & savings banks with lowest 10% Z-scores (1998-2012)
Number Mean
of Banks Z-score Ln(Z-score) Traditional 
Insolvency 
Probability 
Bound
Improved 
Insolvency 
Probability 
Bound
Relative 
Difference 
(%) of 
Traditional vs 
Improved 
Measure
Relative 
Hypothetical 
Capital Ratio 
Buffer (%) 
Equating 
Traditional 
and Improved 
Measure
Hypothetical 
Equity Buffer 
(million USD) 
Equating 
Traditional 
and Improved 
Measure
Banks with lowest 10% Z-scores
OECD 1095 4.767 1.489 0.0816 0.0678 7.509 8.189 17.679
Commercial 895 4.782 1.496 0.0790 0.0661 7.273 8.266 19.338
Cooperative 92 4.820 1.490 0.0888 0.0704 8.834 6.279 7.083
Savings 108 4.601 1.437 0.0970 0.0790 8.330 9.174 12.953
US 812 4.892 1.535 0.0643 0.0565 6.158 5.080 4.175
Commercial 717 4.941 1.551 0.0593 0.0530 5.823 4.430 2.299
Cooperative 2 4.556 1.515 0.0486 0.0463 4.862 2.377 206.061
Savings 93 4.523 1.415 0.1036 0.0836 8.770 10.156 14.294
EU15 130 4.170 1.248 0.1793 0.1324 14.195 29.962 93.468
Commercial 106 3.820 1.139 0.2120 0.1549 16.630 36.340 113.507
Cooperative 12 5.991 1.778 0.0301 0.0292 3.014 1.572 5.197
Savings 12 5.437 1.673 0.0387 0.0370 3.870 2.022 4.728
Source: Own calculations using BvD Bankscope data.
improved measures rises substantially to 7.509% for the OECD sample and is now highest
for cooperative banks at 8.834% overall; it is particularly high for EU15 commercial banks at
16.630% and US savings banks at 8.770% in this case. Lastly, we can also observe from Table
3 that, as expected, the average relative di¤erence between the traditional and improved
measures has gone up throughout when comparing these measures for the pre-crisis (1998-
2006) and crisis (2007-2009) periods, respectively.
As a complementary way of highlighting the economic signicance of the di¤erence be-
tween the traditional and improved measures, we can further ask what hypothetical equity
bu¤ers (i.e. di¤erentials) would lead the traditional and improved measures to be identical
for a given bank.13 We see from Table 1 that the average relative hypothetical capital ratio
13We derive the hypothetical capital-asset ratio carh that equates the traditional and improved
insolvency probability bounds, in the sense that the hypothetical Z-score Zh = (carh + roa)=roa
8
  
bu¤er (or alternatively, average absolute hypothetical equity bu¤er) equating the traditional
and improved measures for our OECD sample is 0.947% ($2.391m) and is highest for com-
mercial banks at 1.116% ($3.068m) overall; it is particularly high for EU15 commercial banks
at 6.775% ($25.198m) and US savings banks at 1.409% (US cooperative banks at $51.977m).
For the banks with the lowest 10% of Z-scores, Table 2 shows that the corresponding average
relative hypothetical capital ratio bu¤er (average absolute hypothetical equity bu¤er) rises
substantially to 8.189% ($17.679m) for the OECD sample and is now highest for savings
banks at 9.174% (commercial banks at $19.338m) overall; it is particularly high for EU15
commercial banks at 36.340% ($113.507m) and US savings banks at 10.156% (US cooperative
banks at $206.061m) in this case.
Overall, while one could argue that the traditional insolvency probability bound gives a
"conservative" measure of a banks probability of insolvency as viewed from a regulators
perspective, the improved insolvency probability bound is clearly the more appropriate mea-
sure in the sense of being more e¤ective to an economically signicant degree, particularly
for banks with higher levels of insolvency risk, and should thus be preferred.
3.2. Forecasting performance
In addition to the e¤ectiveness issue outlined above, it is interesting to look at some
forecasting properties of the traditional as compared with the improved insolvency probability
bound measure. We focus on the recent nancial crisis to highlight this issue, examining how
well those two measures calculated over a pre-crisis sample (covering the years 1998-2006)
were able to forecast the corresponding realized ones calculated over the crisis period (dened
as the years 2007-2009). In order to assess forecasting performance in this context, we use
the coe¢ cient of variation of the root mean squared error (CV(RMSE)), calculated for both
satises (1 + Z2h)
 1 = Z 2 for Z  1 and (1 + Z2h) 1 = 1 for Z < 1; this gives carh =  roa +
roa
p
Z2   1 for Z  1 and carh =  roa for Z < 1. Relative hypothetical capital ratio bu¤ers are
then dened as car=carh 1, and absolute hypothetical equity bu¤ers as (car  carh)TA, with total
assets TA.
9
  
Table 3. Mean, difference in relative difference and forecasting performance of traditional vs improved insolvency
            probability bound measures, between pre-crisis and crisis periods, for OECD commercial. cooperative & 
            savings banks (1998-2009)
Number Mean Coeff. of Coeff. of 
of Banks Traditional 
Insolvency 
Probability 
Bound, Pre-
Crisis Period
Traditional 
Insolvency 
Probability 
Bound, Crisis  
Period
Improved 
Insolvency 
Probability 
Bound, Pre-
Crisis Period
Improved 
Insolvency 
Probability 
Bound, Crisis 
Period
Difference 
Crisis & Pre-
Crisis in 
Relative 
Difference 
(%) of 
Traditional vs 
Improved 
Measure
Variation of 
RMSE, 
Forecast of 
Crisis Value 
with Pre-
Crisis, 
Traditional 
Measures
Variation of 
RMSE, 
Forecast of 
Crisis Value 
with Pre-
Crisis, 
Improved 
Measures
OECD 10945 0.0059 0.0106 0.0051 0.0092 0.4616 3.7488 3.2292
Commercial 7600 0.0062 0.0120 0.0055 0.0104 0.5773 3.5450 3.0543
Cooperative 1729 0.0064 0.0067 0.0054 0.0057 0.0380 2.6126 2.2924
Savings 1616 0.0038 0.0080 0.0032 0.0068 0.3705 5.6299 4.7886
US 7360 0.0042 0.0096 0.0039 0.0088 0.5392 3.7488 3.2292
Commercial 6619 0.0039 0.0090 0.0037 0.0083 0.5186 3.5450 3.0543
Cooperative 8 0.0004 0.0130 0.0004 0.0125 1.2661 2.6126 2.2924
Savings 733 0.0072 0.0154 0.0057 0.0129 0.7173 5.6299 4.7886
EU15 2493 0.0065 0.0111 0.0053 0.0087 0.4241 3.7488 3.2292
Commercial 580 0.0231 0.0420 0.0179 0.0315 1.7241 3.5450 3.0543
Cooperative 1270 0.0016 0.0017 0.0016 0.0017 0.0138 2.6126 2.2924
Savings 643 0.0012 0.0019 0.0012 0.0018 0.0618 5.6299 4.7886
Source: Own calculations using BvD Bankscope data. Pre-crisis period is defined as 1998-2006, crisis one as 2007-2009.
          
the traditional and improved probability bound measures pb as
CV (RMSE) =
q
1
n
Pn
i=1
 
pbprecrisisi   pbcrisisi
2
1
n
Pn
i=1 pb
crisis
i
where the n banks are indexed by i. The results are given in Table 3: we observe that the
coe¢ cient of variation of the RMSE is consistently lower when using the improved insolvency
probability bound measures compared with using the traditional ones, irrespective of country
grouping or bank type. Therefore, the improved insolvency probability bound is the more
accurate measure also in this forecasting context, and should thus be preferred over the
traditional one.
10
  
3.3. Log of Z-score
From a practical implementation point of view, Laeven and Levine (2009) and Houston
et al. (2010) advocate the use of the log of the Z-score over the simple Z-score on the basis that
the latters distribution is heavily skewed, whereas the formers is not. Figure 2 conrms this
observation for our dataset of OECD commercial, cooperative and savings banks, showing also
that both the traditional and the improved insolvency probability bounds have distributions
with degrees of skewness even higher than those of the simple Z-scores.14
On a related note, it is instructive to examine the respective ranges of the di¤erent
insolvency risk measures considered in this context. The improved insolvency probability
bound lies in the interval [0; 1), while the insolvency odds bound and thus, from Corollary
3, the Z-score are meaningfully dened on the interval [0;1); these might thus require the
use of limited dependent variable techniques when the insolvency risk measures are used as
dependent variables in relevant empirical analysis. The log of the Z-score, on the other hand,
has a meaningful probabilistic interpretation on the interval ( 1;1), i.e. the domain of all
real numbers, as a consequence of our renement.
Overall this makes the log of the Z-score an unproblematic insolvency risk measure to
use in standard regression analysis, both as dependent and independent variable; clearly,
this would lend support to its emerging use in the literature, albeit with a now more solidly
founded probabilistic interpretation as a risk measure that is negatively proportional to a
banks log odds of insolvency.
4. Conclusion
We re-examine the probabilistic foundation of the traditional link between Z-score mea-
sures and banksprobability of insolvency, providing an improved measure of that probability
without imposing further distributional assumptions. The traditional measure of the proba-
bility of insolvency thus provides a less e¤ective upper bound of the probability of insolvency,
14Note that skewness of Z-score measures is not a problem in itself, but could complicate inference
in regression analysis.
11
  
Figure 1. Plot of traditional vs. improved insolvency probability bounds, as function of 
             Z-score 
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Figure 2. Skewness of different Z-score measures, calculated for OECD commercial,  
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but can in fact be meaningfully reinterpreted as a measure capturing the odds of insolvency
instead. We obtain analogous rened probabilistic interpretations of the commonly used
simple and log-transformed Z-score measures. In particular, the log of the Z-score is shown
to be negatively proportional to the log odds of insolvency, and thus meaningfully dened
on the domain of all real numbers. As a consequence, it emerges from our renement as an
attractive and unproblematic insolvency risk measure to use (even as a dependent variable
in standard regression analysis), giving now more rigorously founded support to its emerging
use in the literature.
Appendix
A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: This is an application of the one-sided Chebyshev inequality (see
Ross, 1997, p. 414, or previously, Feller, 1971, p. 152): it states that for a random variable
X with nite mean  and variance 2, it holds for any a > 0 that P fX    ag  2
2+a2
.
Setting X = roa and a = car + roa, and dividing both numerator and denominator of the
right hand side of the inequality by 2roa, we obtain Equation (2), with limZ!0 (1 + Z
2)
 1
= 1.
12
  
Proof of Corollary 1: This follows from Equations (1) and (2). The di¤erence between the
traditional and improved measures simplies as D (Z) = Z 2   (1 + Z2) 1 = (Z4 + Z2) 1
for Z  1, and as D (Z) = 1   (1 + Z2) 1 = Z2
1+Z2
for Z < 1 (noting footnote 9), implying
maxZ D (Z) = 0:5 at Z = 1 and limZ!1D (Z) = limZ!0D (Z) = 0.
B. ROE-based Z-score
An alternative, return-on-equity based Z-score measure was rst proposed in Goyeau
and Tarazi (1992) (in the special context of normal return distributions); we can provide a
similarly rened probabilistic interpretation for such a measure that allows for non-normal
return distributions, analogously to the discussion of the more commonly used ROA-based
measure in the main text.
In line with our approach in Section 2, we can equivalently dene bank insolvency as a
state where roe   1, with roe the banks return on equity; this allow us to then state
Proposition 2. If roe is a random variable with nite mean roe and variance 2roe, an upper
bound of the banks probability of insolvency p is given by
p(roe   1)  1
1 + Z2e
< 1 (3)
where the (alternative) Z-score Ze is dened as Ze  1+roeroe > 0.
Proof. This is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1, setting X = roe and a = 1+roe and
dividing both numerator and denominator of the right hand side of the inequality by 2roe;
again, limZe!0 (1 + Z
2
e )
 1
= 1.
It is straightforward to see that this alternative ROE-based Z-score measure behaves and
can be utilized analogously to the more commonly used ROA-based measure discussed in the
main text; for conciseness, we only state the most practically relevant corollary to Proposition
2 as
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Corollary 4. The log of the (alternative) Z-score Ze satises ln

p(roe 1)
1 p(roe 1)

  2 ln (Ze),
i.e. it is (also) negatively proportional to an upper bound of the log odds of insolvency.
Proof. This follows analogously to Corollary 3.
Such an ROE-based Z-score measure (or particularly, in the light of Section 3.3, its log
transformation) might in some respects be more appropriate than the more commonly used
ROA-based measure, as it is by construction una¤ected by potentially spurious variability
in total assets (this aspect could be particularly relevant in the, now increasingly common,
construction of time-varying Z-score measures).
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Highlights 
 
> Re-examine link between Z-score measures and banks' probability of insolvency.  
> Improve on measure of that probability without further distributional assumptions.  
> Log of Z-score is shown to be negatively proportional to the log odds of insolvency. 
 
